The RAND Corporation, the Pentagon-funded think tank, predicts that the Gulf of Thailand could soon be making headlines. In a piece published by Nikkei Asia, Derek Grossman – a senior defense analyst at RAND – anticipates that a large infrastructure project that has just been launched by the Cambodian government has the potential to someday serve as the next flashpoint between China and the US.
The endeavor in question is the construction of the Funan-Techo Canal, the proposed 180-kilometer passageway that would connect the landlocked capital, Phnom Penh, to the Gulf of Thailand. As the article notes, the project is slated to cut shipping via Vietnam by some 70%, in what Cambodia hopes would serve as a significant boost for its economy. However, as far as the US government is concerned, Beijing’s involvement is where the plot thickens. For Washington, the worry is centered on how China – which is bankrolling the $1.7 billion project – will use this future waterway to its advantage.
“For the first time, the canal will grant Beijing access to the Gulf of Thailand directly from China. Because the Mekong River originates in China's Tibetan province, Beijing could sail not just commercial ships, but warships, through Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia and then through the completed Funan-Techo canal and into the Gulf of Thailand,” Grossman notes in the article.
The author then proceeds to itemize all of the potential troubles such access could present for the US. Naturally, an honest assessment of these worries reveals that they have everything to do with the US government’s ongoing obsession with curbing China’s steady rise as a global superpower, and nothing to do with American security.
The first of these concerns is tied to the Strait of Malacca and, according to Grossman, the Pentagon’s fear that the Chinese could potentially attempt to “blunt Washington's uninhibited access” to the slim channel between Indonesia and Malaysia. The analyst notes that the US military’s ability to seize this body of water could “choke Beijing off from resources needed to prosecute conflicts over Taiwan or in the South China Sea.”
Add this to the seemingly bottomless archive of statements and predictions by individuals tied to the US government which appear to imply that a future war between China and the US is all but certain. Coupled with these forecasts is the US government’s bellicose rhetoric, rapid militarization of the region, track record of inciting wars all over the world, and explicit declarations that it will not hesitate to strike China to defend Taiwan.
To put it plainly, it stands to reason that China would be as worried about the US seizing control of something like the Strait of Malacca as the US would be about the prospect of China controlling something like Chesapeake Bay. One of the other advantages of the canal that the author emphasizes is that its completion would allow China’s navy to access the Gulf of Thailand without having to navigate around Vietnam.
“In the years to come, the U.S. could counter by militarizing the Gulf of Thailand in its own right, but that would be a mistake,” writes Grossman. “Rather, Washington should look to engage with regional nations, including, most importantly, Thailand as a security ally, but also Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam as close partners, and even Cambodia itself.”
Because the US has already militarized most of the Indo-Pacific and shows no signs of slowing down, it’s safe to say that this is a mistake Washington is likely to make.
Thank you. I had not heard of this. Of course, a canal in Cambodia is hardly a threat to American security, though it may be a blow to the Vietnamese economy for awhile.
As for Chinese warships using the canal, that seems like a big stretch to me. Ships traversing a canal are practically stationary targets, and this canal would be far longer than the ones in Panama and Egypt.